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Abstract—In this paper, we define noiseless privacy, as a non-
stochastic rival to differential privacy, requiring that the outputs
of a mechanism (i.e., function composition of a privacy-preserving
mapping and a query) can attain only a few values while varying
the data of an individual (the logarithm of the number of the
distinct values is bounded by the privacy budget). Therefore, the
output of the mechanism is not fully informative of the data of
the individuals in the dataset. We prove several guarantees for
noiselessly-private mechanisms. The information content of the
output about the data of an individual, even if an adversary
knows all the other entries of the private dataset, is bounded
by the privacy budget. The zero-error capacity of memory-less
channels using noiselessly private mechanisms for transmission
is upper bounded by the privacy budget. The performance of
a non-stochastic hypothesis-testing adversary is bounded again
by the privacy budget. Finally, assuming that an adversary has
access to a stochastic prior on the dataset, we prove that the
estimation error of the adversary for individual entries of the
dataset is lower bounded by a decreasing function of the privacy
budget. In this case, we also show that the maximal information
leakage is bounded by the privacy budget. In addition to privacy
guarantees, we prove that noiselessly-private mechanisms admit
composition theorem and post-processing does not weaken their
privacy guarantees. We prove that quantization operators can
ensure noiseless privacy if the number of quantization levels is
appropriately selected based on the sensitivity of the query and
the privacy budget. Finally, we illustrate the privacy merits of
noiseless privacy using multiple datasets in energy and transport.
Index Terms—data privacy; noiseless privacy; non-stochastic
information theory; hypothesis testing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Big data revolution, equipped with novel tools for data
collection, analysis, and reporting, has significant promises for
answering societal challenges. These promises however come
at the cost of erosion of privacy. Therefore, there is a need for
rigorous protection of the privacy of individuals.
Natural candidates for privacy protection, such as differen-
tial privacy [1], [2] and information-theoretic privacy [3], [4],
require randomized policies for privacy protection. The defi-
nition of differential privacy assumes the use of randomized
functions as well as the probability of outputs, and conven-
tional information-theoretic tools, such as mutual information
and entropy, rely on random variables.
Heuristic-based privacy-preserving methods, such as k-
anonymity [5], [6] and ℓ-diversity [7], are however determinis-
tic in nature. They employ deterministic mechanisms, such as
suppression and generalization, and do not assume stochastic
properties about the datasets. Popularity of these methods is
evident from the availability of toolboxes for implementation1.
Although providing powerful guarantees, randomized or
stochastic privacy-preserving policies sometimes cause prob-
lems, such as un-truthfulness [8], that are undesirable in
practice [9]. This is touted as a reason behind slow adoption
of differential privacy within financial and health sectors [8].
For instance, randomized policies, stemming from differential
privacy in financial auditing, complicate fraud detection [10],
[11]. Randomized policies can also generate unreasonable and
unrealistic outputs that might mislead investors or market
operators, e.g., by reporting noisy outputs that point to lack
of liquidity in a financial sector while that was not the
case. For instance, the slow-decaying nature of the Laplace
noise means impossible reports (e.g., negative median income)
can occur with a non-negative probability [12]. Randomized
privacy-preserving policies have also encountered difficulties
in medical, health, or social sciences [13], [14]. Furthermore,
the Laplace mechanism, a common approach to ensuring
differential privacy, is shown to cause undesirable properties,
e.g., the optimal estimation in the presence of Laplace noise is
computationally expensive [15]. These motivate the develop-
ment of non-stochastic privacy metrics and privacy-preserving
policies in a rigorous manner.
Although it has been proved that noiseless policies cannot
provide the strong guarantees of randomized policies, e.g.,
it has been proved that differential privacy cannot be deliv-
ered without noise [2], the popularity of noiseless privacy-
preserving policies justifies investigating metrics for analysis
and comparison. This must be done irrespective of their
inherent philosophical weaknesses in comparison to stochastic
policies because they belong to a different category.
In this paper, we define the new notion of noiseless privacy.
Noiseless privacy implies that the outputs of a mechanism
can only attain a few distinct values while varying the data of
an individual. Therefore, the output of the mechanism is not
very informative about the data of the individuals in a dataset.
We prove the following guarantees for the noiselessly-private
mechanisms:
• The information content of the output about the data
of each individual, even if an adversary knows all the
other entries of the private dataset, is bounded from above
by the privacy budget (a constant similar to the privacy
1https://arx.deidentifier.org/overview/related-software/
budget in differential privacy capturing the amount of
the leaked information). As non-stochastic notions of
information, we use non-stochastic information leakage
in [16] and the maximin information [17]. These are
established measures of information in the non-stochastic
information theory literature [16]–[19].
• Zero-error capacity of memory-less channels using
noiselessly-private mechanisms for data transmission is
upper bounded by the privacy budget. Zero-error capacity
is the non-stochastic equivalent of normal capacity, also
coined by Shannon while investigating non-stochastic
communication channels and worst-case behaviours [20].
• The performance of an adversary performing non-
stochastic hypothesis tests [21] on the data of an indi-
vidual, while knowing all the other entries of the private
dataset, is bounded again by the privacy budget.
• Assuming that an adversary has access to a stochastic
prior about the dataset, we prove that the error of an
adversary for estimating the data each individual is lower
bounded by a decreasing function of the privacy budget.
Therefore, by reducing the privacy budget, the estimation
error of the adversary worsens. In this case, we also
show that the maximal information leakage (in the sense
of [65]) is upper bounded by the privacy budget. Hence,
by reducing the privacy budget, we can also reduce the
maximal information leakage.
In addition to these privacy guarantees, we prove the following
important properties:
• Noiselessly-private mechanisms admit composition theo-
rem, i.e., the privacy budgets of the mechanisms add up
when reporting on multiple queries on the same private
dataset.
• Post-processing of noiselessly-private mechanisms does
not weaken their privacy guarantees, i.e., the privacy
budget can only be increased by post-processing.
We also prove that quantization operators can ensure noiseless
privacy. We provide a recipe for determining the number of
quantization levels based on the sensitivity of the query and
the privacy budget. Finally, we illustrate the privacy merits
of noiseless privacy using multiple datasets in energy and
transport.
A. Related Studies
Anonymization: Anonymization is widely used within
public and private sectors for releasing sensitive datasets2
for public competitions and analysis. Although popularly
adopted, anonymization is often insufficient for privacy preser-
vation [22]–[24] and hence, systematic methods with provable
guarantees are required.
Multi-Party Computation and Encryption: We may use
secure multi-party computation, for instance based on ho-
momorphic encryption, to compute aggregate statistics or
machine learning models [25]–[31]. Secure multi-party com-
putation and homomorphic encryption introduce massive com-
2See https://data.gov.au and https://www.kaggle.com for examples.
putation and communication overheads. They also do not fully
eliminate the risk of privacy breaches, e.g., risks associated
with dis-aggregation attacks still remain if these algorithms
are not pared with other privacy-preserving techniques.
Differential Privacy: Differential privacy offers provable
privacy guarantees [2], [32]–[37]. This method uses random-
ization to provide plausible deniability for the data of an
individual by ensuring that the statistics of privacy-preserving
outputs do not change significantly by varying the data of
individual. Additive Laplace and Gaussian noise with scales
proportional to the sensitivity of the submitted query with
respect to the individual entries of the dataset are proved to
guarantee differential privacy [2]. By definition, differential
privacy requires randomization.
Information-Theoretic Privacy: Information-theoretic
privacy, a rival to differential privacy, dates back to
studying secrecy [38] and its generalizations [3], [4], [39],
[40]. Information-theoretic guarantees have been also used to
measure the quantity of leaked private information when using
differential privacy [41], [42]. In information-theoretic privacy,
entropy, mutual information, Kulback-Leiber divergence, and
Fisher information have been repeatedly used as measures
of privacy [43]–[49]. Information theory, starting with
Shannon [50], assumes that data source and communication
channels are random, and is powerful in modelling and
analysing communication systems. However, traditional
notions in information theory, such as mutual information,
are not useful for analysing non-stochastic/noiseless settings
and deterministic privacy-preserving policies.
Deterministic Privacy-Preserving Policies: Noiseless
privacy-preserving policies are often heuristic-based making
them vulnerable to attacks, e.g., k-anonymity is vulnerable
to homogeneity attack [7]. This is because we do not pos-
sess sensible measures/definitions for privacy that extend to
noiseless privacy-preserving policies on deterministic datasets.
Therefore, we cannot prove, in any sense, privacy guaran-
tees of noiseless privacy-preserving (even if weak or limited
in scope or practice). The popularity of noiseless privacy-
preserving policies justifies investigating metrics for analysis
and comparison. In this paper, we propose a rival to differential
privacy that is noiseless. We use non-stochastic information
theory, non-stochastic hypothesis testing, stochastic estima-
tion theory to investigate the merits of this definition. Non-
stochastic information theory dates back to early studies of
information transmission [17], [51]–[54]. It has been recently
used in engineering [55]–[57]. Most recently, non-stochastic
information theory was used in [16] for investigating deter-
ministic privacy-preserving policies. Interestingly, in [16], it
was easily proved that k-anonymity is not privacy-preserving
using non-stochastic information theory, a fact that was only
observed using adversarial attacks in [7].
B. Paper Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Background
material on non-stochastic information theory and hypothesis
testing are presented in Section II. Noiseless privacy is defined
in Section III. In this section, guarantees and properties of
noiseless privacy are also presented. A method for ensuring
noiseless privacy is presented in Section IV. Experimental
results are presented in Section V. Finally, the paper is
concluded in Section VI.
II. UNCERTAIN VARIABLES, HYPOTHESIS TESTING, AND
NON-STOCHASTIC INFORMATION THEORY
We start by reviewing necessary concepts from non-
stochastic information theory, particularly, uncertain variables,
non-stochastic information leakage, and hypothesis testing.
A. Uncertain Variables
Let Ω be an uncertainty set/space whose elements, i.e.,
ω ∈ Ω, model/capture the source of uncertainty. An un-
certain variable X is defined as a mapping on Ω. For any
uncertain variable X : Ω → X, X(ω) is the realization
of uncertain variable X (corresponding to the realization of
uncertainty ω ∈ Ω). Marginal range of uncertain variable
X is JXK := {X(ω) : ω ∈ Ω} ⊆ X. Joint range of
uncertain variables X : Ω → X and Y : Ω → Y is
defined as JX,Y K := {(X(ω), Y (ω)) : ω ∈ Ω} ⊆ X × Y.
Conditional range of uncertain variable X , conditioned on
the realizations of uncertain variable Y belonging to the set
Y , i.e., Y (ω) ∈ Y ⊆ JY K, is given by JX |YK := {X(ω) :
∃ω ∈ Ω such that Y (ω) ∈ Y} ⊆ JXK. If Y is a singleton,
i.e., Y = {y}, we use JX |yK instead of JX |{y}K = JX |YK.
The definition of uncertain variables and their properties are
similar to those of random variables with the exception of not
requiring a measure on Ω. Finally, if the marginal range JXK
is uncountably infinite for an uncertain variable X , we refer to
X as a continuous uncertain variable, similar to a continuous
random variable. If the marginal range JXK is countable for an
uncertain variable X , we call X a discrete uncertain variable.
B. Non-Stochastic Information Theory
Non-stochastic entropy of discrete uncertain variable X is
H0(X) := log2(|JXK|) ∈ R ∪ {±∞}. (1)
This is commonly referred to as the Hartley entropy [17],
[51]. For continuous uncertain variable X , the non-stochastic
(differential) entropy is given by
h0(X) := loge(µ(|JXK|)) ∈ R ∪ {±∞}, (2)
where µ(·) is the Lebesgue measure. This is sometimes
referred to as Re´nyi differential 0-entropy [17]. The authors
of [17], [58] define the non-stochastic conditional entropy of
uncertain variable X , conditioned on uncertain variable Y , as
H0(X |Y ) := max
y∈JY K
log2(|JX |yK|), (3)
for discrete uncertain variables X and Y . Similarly, for con-
tinuous uncertain variables X and Y , we get
h0(X |Y ) := ess sup
y∈JY K
loge(µ(JX |yK)). (4)
Now, we can define non-stochastic information between un-
certain variables X and Y as the difference of the entropy of
X with and without access to realizations of Y . Hence, for
discrete uncertain variables, non-stochastic information can be
defined as
I0(X ;Y ) :=H0(X)−H0(X |Y )
= min
y∈JY K
log2
(
|JXK|
|JX |yK|
)
. (5)
For continuous uncertain variables, non-stochastic information
can be similarly defined as I0(X ;Y ) := h0(X) − h0(X |Y ).
It is clear that the non-stochastic information is in fact not
symmetric, i.e., I0(X ;Y ) 6= I0(Y ;X) in general.
With slight adaptation, Kolmogorov had previously defined
‘combinatorial’ conditional entropy using log(|JX |yK|) and the
information gain as |JXK|/|JX |yK| in [52]. The combinatorial
conditional entropy and the information gain are only defined
for a fixed realization Y (ω) = y while (5) is based on the
worst-case scenario.
In [16], it was observed that, in the context of information-
theoretic privacy, the non-stochastic information (5) is not a
good measure of information leakage and therefore, the non-
stochastic information leakage was proposed as
L0(X ;Y ) := max
y∈JY K
log2
(
|JXK|
|JX |yK|
)
, (6)
for discrete uncertain variables. Similarly, for continuous un-
certain variables, the non-stochastic information leakage was
defined as
L0(X ;Y ) := ess sup
y∈JY K
loge
(
µ(JXK)
µ(JX |yK)
)
. (7)
In general, the non-stochastic information I0 and non-
stochastic information leakage L0 are not equal, i.e,
I0(X ;Y ) 6= L0(Y ;X). In fact, from the definition, it is
easy to see that I0(X ;Y ) ≤ L0(X ;Y ). Further, L0(X ;Y )
is not symmetric. We propose the symmetrized non-stochastic
information leakage as
Ls0(X ;Y ) := min(L0(X ;Y ), L0(Y ;X)). (8)
Note that, by construction, Ls0(X ;Y ) = L
s
0(Y ;X).
a) Maximin Information: In [17], the maximin informa-
tion was introduced as a symmetric measure of information
and its relationship with zero-error capacity was explored. To
present the definition of the maximin information, we need to
introduce the notion of overlap partitions:
• x, x′ ∈ JXK are JX |Y K-overlap connected, or in short
x ! x′, if there exists a finite sequence of conditional
ranges {JX |yiK}
n
i=1 such that x ∈ JX |y1K, x
′ ∈ JX |ynK,
and JX |yiK ∩ JX |yi+1K 6= ∅ for all i = 1, . . . , n− 1;
• A ⊆ JXK is JX |Y K-overlap connected if all x, x′ ∈ A
are JX |Y K-overlap connected;
• A,B ⊆ JXK are JX |Y K-overlap isolated if there does not
exist x ∈ A, x′ ∈ B such that x, x′ are JX |Y K-overlap
connected;
• An JX |Y K-overlap partition is a partition of JXK such
that each member set is JX |Y K-overlap connected and
all two member sets are JX |Y K-overlap isolated.
Symmetry, i.e., x ! x′ implies that x′ ! x, and
transitivity, i.e., x ! x′ and x′ ! x′′ implies that x ! x′′,
guarantee that a unique JX |Y K-overlap partition always ex-
ists [17]. The unique JX |Y K-overlap partition is shown by
JX |Y K⋆ in what follows. The maximin information is
I⋆(X ;Y ) := log2(|JX |Y K⋆|). (9)
In [17], it was proved that |JX |Y K⋆| = |JY |XK⋆| and thus
I⋆(X ;Y ) = I⋆(Y ;X). We now prove an important result
regarding the relationship between non-stochastic information
leakage and maximin information.
Proposition 1. For discrete uncertain variable Y , I⋆(X ;Y ) ≤
Ls0(X ;Y ).
Proof. See Appendix A.
An uncertain time series X is a sequence of uncertain
variables X [k] : Ω → X for all k ∈ N. Alternatively, we
can think of uncertain time series X as a mapping from
the sample space Ω to the set of discrete-time functions
X
∞ := {∀x : N→ X}.
Now, we can define a memory-less uncertain communi-
cation channel. A memory-less uncertain channel maps any
uncertain time series X to uncertain time series Y such that
JY [k], . . . , Y [1]|X [k](ω) = x[k], . . . , X [1](ω) = x[1]K
= JY [k]|X [k](ω) = x[k]K × · · · × JY [1]|X [1](ω) = x[1]K,
for all (x[k], . . . , x[1]) ∈ JX [k], . . . , X [1]K and all k ∈ N. A
code of length k is a finite set F ⊆ Xk with each codeword
f ∈ F denoting a distinct message. Define
X (y[k], . . . , y[1])
:= JX [k], . . . , X [1]|Y [k](ω) = y[k], . . . , Y [1](ω) = y[1]K.
The zero-error capacity is
C0 := lim
k→∞
sup
F ⊆ Xk :
|F ∩ X (y[k], . . . , y[1])| ≤ 1,
∀(y[k], . . . , y[1]) ∈ Yk
log2(|F|)
k
. (10)
In what follows, we only consider sequence of discrete
uncertain variables Y [k]. Now, we are ready to relate the
symmetrized non-stochastic information leakage to zero-error
capacity of memory-less uncertain channels.
Proposition 2. Any memory-less uncertain channel satisfies
C0 ≤ supJX[k]K⊆X L
s
0(X [k];Y [k]).
Proof. See Appendix B.
C. Non-Stochastic Hypothesis Testing
Consider uncertain variable X denoting the original uncer-
tain variable. An adversary is interested in testing the validity
of a hypothesis for the realizations of X . The adversary does
not have access to realizations of this uncertain variable as
p0
p1
JX |p0KJ
X
|p 1
K
Ω
JXK JHK
JY |JX|p0KK \ JY |JX|p1KK
JY |JX|p1KK \ JY |JX|p0KK
JY |JX|p1KK ∩ JY |JX|p0KK
JY K
Fig. 1: Relationship between uncertain variables in non-
stochastic hypothesis testing based on uncertain measure-
ments. If the realization of uncertain measurement Y belongs
to JY |p0K ∩ JY |p1K, there is not enough evidence to accept
or reject the null hypothesis p0 or the alternative hypothesis
p1. However, if the realization of uncertain measurement Y
belongs to (JY |p0K \ JY |p1K) ((JY |p1K \ JY |h2K)), we can
confidently accept (reject) the null hypothesis p0 and reject
(accept) the alternative hypothesis p1.
otherwise hypothesis testing is trivial. Instead, it has access
to an uncertain measurement of this variable denoted by Y .
This is captured by that Y (ω) = gY (X(ω)) for a mapping
gY : JXK → JY K. Recalling that uncertain variables are
mappings from the uncertainty set, it must be that Y = gY ◦X ,
where ◦ denotes composition of mappings. Similarly, we
may define the hypothesis as an uncertain variable H with
binary range JHK = {p0, p1}, where p0 denotes the null
hypothesis and p1 denotes the alternative hypothesis. We
assume that there exists a mapping gH : JXK → JHK such
that H = gH ◦X ; the hypothesis is constructed based on the
uncertain variable X as H(ω) = gH(X(ω)). This setup and
the relationship between all uncertain variables is summarized
in Figure 1.
A test is a function T : JY K → JHK = {p0, p1}. If
T (Y ) = p1, the test rejects the null hypothesis in favour of the
alternative hypothesis; however, if T (Y ) = p0, the test accepts
the null hypothesis (and rejects the alternative hypothesis). The
set of all tests is given by C(JHK, JY K) which captures the set
of all functions from JY K to JHK. Following [21], we say that
a test T ∈ C(JHK, JY K) is correct at a particular realization
of uncertain variable Y , Y (ω) = y ∈ JY K, if JH |JX |yKK =
{T (y)}. The set of all outputs at which test T is correct is
equal to ℵ(T ) := {y ∈ JY K : JH |JX |yKK = {T (y)}}. Based
on this definition of correctness, we can define a performance
measure for tests [21]. If Y is a continuous uncertain variable,
the performance is
P(T ) := loge(µ(ℵ(T ))). (11)
Similarly, if Y is a discrete uncertain variable, the performance
is equal to
P(T ) := log2(|ℵ(T )|). (12)
In the following result, ∆ denotes the symmetric difference
operator on the sets, i.e., A∆B = (A \ B) ∪ (B \ A).
Proposition 3 ([21]). The performance of any test T ∈
C(JHK, JY K) is bounded by P(T ) ≤ loge(µ(JY |p0K∆JY |p1K))
if Y is a continuous uncertain variable, and by P(T ) ≤
log2(|JY |p0K∆JY |p1K|) if Y is a discrete uncertain variable.
Note that, for any realization of uncertain variable Y in the
set JY |p0K∩JY |p1K, there is not enough evidence to accept or
reject either the null hypothesis or the alternative hypothesis.
This is because these realizations can be caused by realizations
of X that are consistent with the null hypothesis p0 or realiza-
tions of X that are consistent with the alternative hypothesis
p1. On the other hand, if the realization of the measurement
Y is in the set (JY |p0K \ JY |p1K) ∪ (JY |p1K \ JY |h2K) =
JY |p0K∆JY |p1K, we can confidently reject or accept the null
hypothesis or the alternative hypothesis. Proposition 3 can be
thought of as a non-stochastic equivalent of the Chernoff-
Stein Lemma; see, e.g., [59, Ch. 11] for randomized hypothesis
testing. The size of the set JY |p0K∆JY |p1K essentially captures
the difference between the ranges JY |p0K and JY |p1K re-
sembling the Kullback–Leibler divergence in a non-stochastic
framework.
III. NOISELESS PRIVACY:
DEFINITION, GUARANTEES, AND PROPERTIES
We model a private dataset by a realization of a vector-
valued uncertain variable X : Ω → Rn with n denoting the
number of individuals whose data is in the dataset. The dataset
is therefore in the form of
X(ω) =


X1(ω)
X2(ω)
...
Xn(ω)

 ,
where Xi(ω) ∈ R is the data of the i-th individual. Evidently,
each Xi : Ω→ R, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is itself an uncertain variable.
A data curator, in possession of the realization of uncertain
variable X , i.e., the private dataset X(ω), must return a
response to a query f : JXK → Rq for some q ∈ N. The
curator employs a mechanism M : Rq → Rq to generate a
a privacy-preserving response. Throughout this paper, M ◦ f
is referred to as the mechanism of the curator. This is the
same language used in the privacy literature albeit without
the presence of the randomness [1], [60]. Therefore, the
curator provides the response Y (ω) = M ◦ f(X(ω)). By
definition, Y = M ◦ f ◦ X is an uncertain variable. In the
remainder of this paper, we use the notation x−i to denote
(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn) for vectors and X−i to denote
(X1, . . . , Xi−1, Xi+1, . . . , Xn) for uncertain variables alike.
In this notation, −i refers essentially refers to the set of all
individuals except the i-th one.
Definition 1 (Noiseless Privacy). A mechanism M ◦ f is
ǫ-noiselessly private, for ǫ > 0, if
|JY |X−i(ω) = x−iK| ≤ 2
ǫ, ∀x−i ∈ JX−iK, ∀i. (13)
Note that this definition is akin to a noiseless differential
privacy. This is because, instead of bounding the information
leakage as in information-theoretic privacy [16], the output
realizations are restricted if one individual entry of the dataset
changes. Note that, when the data of i-th individual changes,
the output can take all the values within the set JY |X−i(ω) =
x−iK. If this set is not informative, i.e., it does not contain
many elements, reverse engineering the data of i-th individual
changes with knowledge of X(ω) even in the presence of side-
channel information is a difficult task. In what follows, we
use non-stochastic information theory to establish the extend
of the privacy guarantees from noiseless privacy. Similar to
differential privacy, we can also define a local version of
noiseless privacy.
Definition 2 (Local Noiseless Privacy). Assume that fi :
(xi)
n
i=1 7→ xi for each i. A mechanism M is ǫ-locally
noiselessly private if M ◦ fi is ǫ-noiselessly private for
all i.
A. Guarantee: Non-Stochastic Information Leakage
We define a function ψi,v−i : JXK → JXiK×{v−i} replacing
the value of Xj(ω) or the realization of Xj , for all 1 ≤ j ≤
except for j = i, with given constants vj , i.e., ψi,v−j (X(ω)) =
(v1, . . . , vi−1, Xi(ω), vi+1, . . . , vn). Let Ψi = {ψi,v−j | v−j ∈
JX−iK} be the set of all such functions for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
The uncertain variable ψi,v−i ◦ X becomes unrelated (in the
sense of [17]) to X−i for all ψi,v−i ∈ Ψi.
This definition allows us to measure the amount of the
information that the curator’s mechanism leaks about the data
of the i-the individual Xi(ω). For a given ψi,v−i ∈ Ψi, let us
define Y = M◦f◦ψi,v−i◦X . Now, the information between Y
andXi captures how much more information can an adversary
extract from Y knowing the data of all the individuals except
the i-the individual. This is because, here, we let the adversary
to select any possible ψi,v−i .
Theorem 1 (Non-Stochastic Information vs Noiseless
Privacy). Assume X is a discrete uncertain variable,
Y = M ◦ f ◦ ψi,v−i ◦ X , and M ◦ f is ǫ-noiselessly
private. For any ψi,v−i ∈ Ψi,
0 ≤ I⋆(Xi;Y ) ≤ L
s
0(Xi;Y ) ≤ L0(Y ;Xi) ≤ ǫ. (14)
Proof. See Appendix C.
Theorem 1 shows that, by reducing ǫ, we can reduce the
amount of the leaked information about each individual. This
makes sense. Consider the case where ǫ = +∞. In this case,
the curator can report the output of the query f(ψi,v−i ◦X(ω))
completely (i.e., M can be chosen to be equal identity) and
the adversary, knowing v−i, can compute the data of the data
of the i-th individualXi(ω) (at least if the adversary select the
query to be linear with non-zero weight for the i-th individual).
On the other hand, if ǫ = 0, the output becomes a constant
that is independent of Xi(ω) and thus the adversary learns
nothing new about the data of the i-th individual Xi(ω).
B. Guarantee: Zero-Error Capacity
Let us consider a memory-less noiselessly-private communi-
cation channel. This can be seen as a non-stochastic equivalent
of differentially-private communication channels in [61].
Let M◦f be a ǫ-noiselessly private for some ǫ > 0. For any
given sequence of mappings {ψti,v−i}t∈N with ψ
t
i,v−i
∈ Ψi,
a memory-less ǫ-noiselessly-private channel maps any uncer-
tain time series X = (X [k], . . . , X [1]) to uncertain time
series Y = (Y [k], . . . , Y [1]) such that Y [ℓ](ω) = M ◦ f ◦
ψℓi,v−i(X(ω)) for all 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k and k ∈ N.
This setup can be seen as a case in which the curator
is reporting on a stream of data from the individuals. We
can assume that an extremely strong adversary can set the
realizations of the data of all individuals except the i-th
individual. The capacity of the channel captures the amount
of information that passes through a ǫ-noiselessly private
mechanism over time.
Theorem 2 (Zero-Error Capacity vs Noiseless Privacy).
Assume, for all k, X [k] is a discrete uncertain variable,
Y [k] = M ◦ f ◦ψℓi,v−i ◦X [k], and M ◦ f is ǫ-noiselessly
private. For any ψi,v−i ∈ Ψi, the zero-error capacity of
memory-less ǫ-noiselessly-private channel is bounded by
C0 ≤ ǫ. (15)
Proof. The rest of the proof follows from Proposition 2 and
Theorem 1.
C. Guarantee: Non-Stochastic Hypothesis Testing
In this part, our analysis is motivated by the definition of
semantic security or indistinguishability under chosen plaintext
attack [62]. Assume that an adversary selects i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
xi, x
′
i ∈ JXiK, and provides this information to the curator. The
curator uses uncertain variable Xi : Ω → JX iK := {xi, x
′
i}
to constructs uncertain variable X = (X−i, Xi). Fix ψi,v−i ∈
Ψi. The curator then generates a realization X(ω), computes
Y (ω) = M ◦ f ◦ ψi,v−i(X(ω)), and provides Y (ω) to the
adversary. The adversary tests whether the realization of the
data of individual i is equal to xi or x
′
i knowing that it is bound
to be one of those values and knowing that the value of the
data of all the other individuals is fixed to v−i. We define the
hypothesis uncertain variable H using gH : X(ω) 7→ H(ω) as
H(ω) = gH(X(ω)) =
{
p0, Xi(ω) = xi,
p1, Xi(ω) = x
′
i.
The following theorem bounds the performance of the adver-
sary for performing its hypothesis test.
Theorem 3 (Hypothesis Testing vs Noiselss Privacy).
Assume Y = M◦f ◦ψi,v−i ◦X¯ and M◦f is ǫ-noiselessly
private. Then, for any test T and any ψi,v−i ∈ Ψi, the
performance of the adversary is bounded by
P(T ) ≤ ǫ. (16)
Proof. See Appendix D.
Bounding the performance of a hypothesis-testing adversary
is in essence close to identifiability [63], [64] for which privacy
preservation relates to the potential of an adversary identifying
the private data of individuals based on the received outputs.
D. Guarantee: Performance of Adversaries with Stochastic
Priors
In this subsection, we briefly assume that the dataset is ran-
domly distributed according to the probability density function
p, i.e., for any Lebesgue-measurable set X ⊆ JXK, P{X ∈
X} =
∫
x∈JXK
ξ(x)µ(x). We also consider an adversary that
knows the realizations of all the entries of the dataset except
the entry of the i-th individual. It constructs an estimate of
the missing entry Xi using an estimator Xˆi(X−i,M ◦ f(X))
using its prior information X−i and the response M ◦ f(X).
Theorem 4 (Stochastic Prior vs Noiselss Privacy). As-
sume that ρ = infx∈JXK ξ(x) > 0, M ◦ f is ǫ-noiselessly
private, and f−1 ◦M−1(y) is a connected set for any
y ∈ JY K. For any p ∈ N,
E{(Xi − Xˆi(X−i,M ◦ f(X)))
p|X−i}
≥
(
ρµ(JXiK)
p+1
22p+2
)
2−ǫ(p+1). (17)
Proof. See Appendix E.
The lower bound on the adversary’s estimation performance
in Theorem 4 is an decreasing function of ǫ. Therefore, as
expected and in-line with the earlier results, by decreasing ǫ,
we can reduce the adversary’s ability to infringe on the privacy
of any individual in the dataset even if the adversary knows
the data of all the other individuals.
E. Guarantee: Stochastic Maximal Leakage
In this section, we can recreate the stochastic framework
for information leakage in [65] by again endowing all the
uncertain variables with a measure. This way, we can define
the maximal stochastic leakage from X to Y as
Lc(X → Y ) = sup
U−X−Y−Uˆ
log
(
P{U = Uˆ}
maxu∈JUK PU (u)
)
where the supremum is taken over all random variables U, Uˆ
taking values in the same finite arbitrary alphabets. Here, U −
X − Y − Uˆ states that these variables from a Markov chain
in the introduced order. It was shown in [65] that
Lc(X → Y ) = log

 ∑
y∈JY K
max
x∈JXK:PX(x)>0
PY |X(y|x)


= I∞(X ;Y ).
Theorem 5 (Maximal Leakage vs Noiseless Privacy).
Assume Y = M◦f ◦ψi,v−i ◦X and M◦f is ǫ-noiselessly
private. Then, Lc(Xi → Y ) ≤ ǫ.
Proof: Note that supPY |X Lc(X → Y ) ≤ H0(Y ) because
of [65, Lemma 1 & Example 6]. Furthermore, |JM◦f ◦ψi,v−i◦
XK| = |JY |X−i(ω) = v−iK| ≤ 2ǫ.
Evidently, the amount of the leaked information is upper
bounded by the privacy budget. Hence, by reducing the
privacy budget, we can minimize the amount of the leaked
information.
F. Property: Composition of Noiselessly-Private Mechanisms
Composition of differentially-private mechanisms [2], [66],
[67] is an important result showing that the privacy budgets
add up when reporting on multiple queries on the same private
dataset. In what follows, we show that the same also applies
to noiseless privacy.
Theorem 6 (Composition of Noiselessly-Private Mech-
anisms). Let M1 and M2 be such that M1 ◦ f and
M2 ◦ f are ǫ1-noiseless private and ǫ2-noiseless private,
respectively. Then, (M1,M2) ◦ f is (ǫ1 + ǫ2)-noiseless
private.
Proof. See Appendix F.
G. Property: Post-Processing of Noiselessly-Private Mecha-
nisms
Finally, an important property of differentially-private
mechanisms and information-theoretic privacy is that the pri-
vacy guarantees do not weaken by post-processing privacy-
preserving outputs [2]. In what follows, this also holds for
noiselessly-private mechanisms as well.
Theorem 7 (Post-Processing of Noiselessly-Private
Mechanisms). Let M be such that M ◦ f is ǫ-noiseless
private. Then, g ◦M ◦ f is also ǫ-noiseless private for
any mapping g.
Proof. See Appendix G.
IV. NOISELESS PRIVACY: SATISFACTION
We can ensure noiseless privacy using non-stochastic ap-
proaches, such as binning or quantization. To do so, first, we
define linear quantizers.
Adversary Curator
select i0 and i1
i0 and i1
j ← {0, 1}
select i2, . . . , in
y, t
y = M ◦ f(xij ,t, xi2,t, . . . , xin,t)
estimate j
jˆ
return j = jˆ
Fig. 2: The timing of a game used for evaluating the ability of
an adversary in guessing if the data of a particular individual
belongs to a publicly-released noiselessly-private aggregate
statistics.
Definition 3 (Linear Quantizer). A q-level quantizer Q :
[xmin, xmax] → {b1, . . . , bq} is a piecewise constant function
defined as
Q(x) =


b1, x ∈ [x1, x2),
b2, x ∈ [x2, x3),
...
...
bq−1, x ∈ [xq−1, xq),
bq, x ∈ [xq, xq+1],
where (bi)
q
i=1 are distinct symbols and x1 ≤ x2 ≤ · · · ≤
xq are real numbers such that x1 = xmin, xq+1 = xmax,
xi+1 − xi = (xmax − xmin)/q for all 1 ≤ i ≤ q.
We can show that linear quantizers can achieve noiseless
privacy for any query on private datasets. This is proved in
the next theorem.
Theorem 8. Let Jf(X)|XK ⊆ [ymin, ymax]. Define sen-
sitivity of query f as
S(f) := sup
x−i∈JX−iK
µ(f(JXiK× {x−i}))
= sup
x−i∈JX−iK
sup
x
i
,x′
i
∈JXiK
|f(x′i, x−i)− f(xi, x−i)|.
The mechanism M ◦ f is ǫ-noiseless private if M is a
q-level quantizer with
q ≤
2ǫ(ymax − ymin)
Sf
.
Proof. See Appendix H.
V. EXPERIMENTS
A. Energy Data: Reporting Aggregate
For this part, we use a publicly available dataset from the
Ausgrid3 containing half-hour smart meter measurements for
300 randomly-selected homes with rooftop solar systems over
the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2013. In this paper,
we use the data over July 2012 to June 2013.
3https://www.ausgrid.com.au/Industry/Innovation-and-research/Data-to-share/Solar-home-electricity-data
Let xi,t denote the consumption of house i at day t. We
consider reporting aggregate statistics
yt = f((xi,t)
n
i=1) =
1
n
(x1,t + · · ·+ xn,t), ∀t.
Here, f denotes the query. We particularly use the mechanism
in Theorem 8 to report noiselessly-private outputs. In this
experiment, we test the ability of an adversary for inferring if
a particular household has contributed to the aggregate or not
as in [68]. We use a game, as in [68], [69], to evaluate the
ability of the adversary. The setup of the game is summarized
in Figure 2. At first, the adversary can select two households
i0, i1. The curator select one of those households uniformly at
random ij . It also selects an additional n−1 households. Then
it reports the privacy-preserving aggregate outputs. Based on
the reported output, the adversary guesses the participating
household ijˆ . The adversary’s success or advantage is then
defined as
Adv := 2|P{j = jˆ} − 1/2|.
Small Adv means that the adversary is as successful as
randomly guessing and large Adv implies that the adversary
is successful in recognizing the household participating in the
aggregate.
Similar to [68], we use three adversary policies. The first
one is based on correlation. In this case, the adversary selects
j ∈ {0, 1} based on the correlation between (xij ,t)t and
(yt)t. The second policy is based on mean square error. In
this case, the adversary selects j ∈ {0, 1} by minimizing the
square error ‖(xij ,t)t − (yt)t‖2. Finally, the last policy uses
the relative peaks of each load profile (xi0,t)t, (xi1,t)t, and
(yt)t. In this case, the adversary selects j ∈ {0, 1} based on
the most common peaks between (xi0,t)t and (yt)t, or (xi1,t)t
and (yt)t.
Figure 3 illustrates the advantage of the adversary Adv
when using the correlation-based policy (left), the mean square
error policy (center), and the peak-based policy (right). As
ǫ grows larger, the adversary’s advantage tends toward the
non-private case in [68]. Clearly, even for moderate ǫ when
considering small groups, the adversary’s advantage is very
small. This is not the case for non-private outputs as observed
in [68]. For instance, for small groups and moderate privacy
budgets, such as n = 4 and ǫ = 2 or n = 8 and ǫ = 3,
the adversary’s advantage is negligible (almost zero). This
shows that combining noiseless privacy with aggregation is
an excellent tool for providing privacy to individuals.
B. Energy Data: Reporting Single Consumption
Non-intrusive load monitoring provides tools for extract-
ing appliance-specific energy consumption statistics from the
smart meter readings of a household and and is one of privacy
concerns behind releasing energy data [70], [71]. In this
section, we use Theorem 8 to report high-frequency energy
consumption of a household in a privacy-preserving manner
using local noiseless privacy. We then proceed to see the effect
of privacy budget on an adversary performing non-intrusive
load monitoring.
We use the low frequency data from the first house in the
REDD database4 database [72], which contains the consump-
tion of various appliances in the house every 3-4 seconds. This
data in conjunction with the consumption of the entire house
is used for training and verification of a non-intrusive load
monitoring algorithm. The consumption of the entire house is
measured every second. The data is for the period of April
23–May 21, 2011. The part of the data prior to April 30th is
used for training and the rest for validation purposes. We select
the top 5 appliances in energy consumption for disaggregation
purposes, namely, fridge, microwave, socket (in the kitchen),
light, and dish washer. For non-intrusive load monitoring, we
have used the NILMTK5 toolbox in Python [73]. We have
used a frequently utilized combinatorial optimization method
for non-intrusive load monitoring. We report the success of
the non-intrusive load monitoring using the f -score.
Figure 4 shows the f-score of the non-intrusive load mon-
itoring algorithm based on combinatorial optimization versus
the privacy budget. As we can see the f -score gets rapidly
bad as ǫ decrease. This means an adversary would not be able
to identify the appliances that are used within the household
reliably. This illustrates the power of local noiseless privacy
in reporting energy consumption of households for analysis
while protecting the privacy of the households.
C. Transport Data: Reporting Individual Source-Destinations
Finally, we use New York City Taxi Cab trips6 for 2014.
We use the first million trips and focus on trips that begin
and end within the New York City in Figure 5. Here, we
consider reporting the start-end point of the taxi rides in a
locally noiselessly private manner. In this subsection, we again
use Theorem 8 to report start-end points of taxi rides in the
New York City in a privacy-preserving manner using local
noiseless privacy. In this case, for each ǫ, we split the latitude
and the longitude into 2ǫ/2 boxes. Therefore, the privacy of the
total privacy budget for the reported outputs is 2ǫ, following
Theorem 6.
Figure 6 illustrates the portion of unique start-end points of
taxi rides versus the privacy budget. As we can see, the portion
of unique start-end points is negligible for small ǫ. This means
an adversary would not be able to attribute a specific taxi ride
to an individual, thus protecting the privacy of contributing
individuals.
VI. DISCUSSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we defined noiseless privacy, as a non-
stochastic rival to differential privacy, requiring that the
outputs of the mechanism to attain very few values while
varying the data of an individual remains. We proved that
noiseless-private mechanisms admit composition theorem and
post-processing does not weaken their privacy guarantees.
We proved that quantization operators can ensure noiseless
privacy. We finally illustrated the privacy merits of noiseless
4http://redd.csail.mit.edu/
5https://github.com/nilmtk/nilmtk
6https://www.kaggle.com/kentonnlp/2014-new-york-city-taxi-trips
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Fig. 5: Map of New York City: latitude in [40.92◦, 40.49◦]
and longitude in [-74.27◦,-73.68◦]
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privacy and local noiseless privacy using multiple datasets in
energy and transport.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
First, we prove that I⋆(X ;Y ) ≤ L0(X ;Y ). Let I⋆(X ;Y ) =
m. Then, JX |Y K⋆ = {P1, . . . , P2m}. Each Pi is non-empty.
Therefore, there exists at least one x such that x ∈ Pi. Note
that x must also belong to JX |yK for any y ∈ JY |xK. We prove
that JX |yK ⊆ Pi. Assume that this not the case. Therefore,
there exist an element of x′ ∈ JX |yK, distinct from x, that
belongs to another Pj , j 6= i, because {P1, . . . , P2m} covers
JXK. We know that Pi and Pj are JX |Y K-overlap isolated
by the definition of partition JX |Y K⋆. On the other hand, we
evidently have x ! x′ (by the definition of JX |Y K-overlap
connectedness). This is a contradiction and thus JX |yK must
be a subset of Pi. This results in |JX |yK| ≤ |Pi| and hence
min
y∈JY K
|JX |yK| ≤ Pi, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , 2
m}. (18)
On the other hand,
⋃2m
i=1 Pi = JXK because {P1, . . . , P2m} is
a partition for JXK. Because of the non-overlapping nature of
the sets {P1, . . . , P2m}, we get
2m∑
i=1
|Pi| = |JXK|. (19)
Combining (18) and (19) results in 2mminy∈JY K |JX |yK| ≤
|JXK|. This implies that I⋆(X ;Y ) ≤ L0(X ;Y ). Similarly, we
can show that I⋆(Y ;X) ≤ L0(Y ;X). By symmetry of the
maximin information [17], i.e., I⋆(X ;Y ) = I⋆(Y ;X), we get
that I⋆(X ;Y ) ≤ L0(X ;Y ) and I⋆(X ;Y ) ≤ L0(Y ;X). This
concludes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Let ℵ(y[k], . . . , y[1]) denote the statement Y [k](ω) =
y[k], . . . , Y [1](ω) = y[1]. Note that
2L0(X[k],...,X[1];Y [k],...,Y [1])
= max
(y[i])k
i=1
∈JY Kk
|JX [k], . . . , X [1]K|
|JX [k], . . . , X [1]|ℵ(y[k], . . . , y[1])K|
=
|JX [k], . . . , X [1]K|
min(y[i])k
i=1
∈JY Kk |JXk, . . . , X1|ℵ(y[k], . . . , y[1])K|
=
∏k
ℓ=1 |JX [ℓ]K|∏k
ℓ=1 miny[ℓ]∈JY K |JX [ℓ]|Y [ℓ](ω) = y[ℓ]K|
=
k∏
ℓ=1
|JX [ℓ]K|
miny[ℓ]∈JY K |JX [ℓ]|Y [ℓ](ω) = y[ℓ]K|
=
k∏
ℓ=1
L0(X [ℓ];Y [ℓ])
= (L0(X [ℓ];Y [ℓ]))
k.
Therefore,
L0(X [k], . . . , X [1];Y [k], . . . , Y [1]) = kL0(X [ℓ];Y [ℓ]),
and, as a result,
L0(X [k], . . . , X [1];Y [k], . . . , Y [1])/k = L0(X [ℓ];Y [ℓ]).
Similarly, we can show that
L0(Y [k], . . . , Y [1];X [k], . . . , X [1])/k = L0(Y [ℓ];X [ℓ]).
Combining these inequalities with Proposition 1 in this paper
and Theorem 4.1 in [17] proves the result.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Note that
2L
s
0
(Xi;Y ) ≤2L0(Y ;Xi)
= sup
xi∈JXiK
|JY K|
JY |Xi(ω) = xiK
=|JY K|
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
x′
i
∈JXiK
JY |Xi(ω) = x
′
i, X−i(ω) = v−iK
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= |JY |X−i(ω) = v−iK|
≤2ǫ,
where the second equality follows from that the realization of
Y can be uniquely determined based on the realization of Xi,
i.e., JY |Xi(ω) = xiK is a singleton. Therefore, Ls0(Xi;Y ) ≤
L0(Y ;Xi) ≤ ǫ. The rest follows from Proposition 1.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Since Y is a discrete uncertain variable, for any test T ,
Theorem 3 states that the performance of the adversary is
bounded from the above by P(T ) ≤ log2(|JY |Xi(ω) =
xiK∆JY |Xi(ω) = x′iK|). Now, note that JY |Xi(ω) =
xiK∆JY |Xi(ω) = x
′
iK ⊆ JY |X−i(ω) = v−iK. Therefore,
|JY |Xi(ω) = xiK∆JY |Xi(ω) = x′iK| ≤ |JY |X−i(ω) =
v−iK| ≤ 2ǫ. This concludes the proof.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Define function g(·) such that g(Xi) = M ◦ f(X). There
must exists y ∈ JY K such that µ(g−1(y))) ≥ µ(JXiK)2−ǫ. As
otherwise, µ(g−1(y)) < µ(JXiK)2
−ǫ for all y ∈ JY K and thus
µ(JXiK) = µ

 ⋃
y∈JY K
g−1(y)


=
∑
y∈JY K
µ
(
g−1(y)
)
<
∑
y∈JY K
µ(JXiK)2
−ǫ
= µ(JXiK).
This is a contradiction. Hence, we get
E{(Xi − Xˆi(X−i,M ◦ f(X))
p|X−i}
≥ ρ
∫
g−1(y)
(Xi − Xˆi(X−i,M ◦ f(X))
pdµ(Xi),
where ρ = infX∈JXK ξ(X). Since g
−1(y) is a connected set,
there must exists xi, xi such that closure of the g
−1(y) is equal
to [xi, xi]. Hence, we get∫
g−1(y)
(Xi−Xˆi(X−i,M ◦ f(X))
pdµ(Xi)
=
∫ xi
xi
(Xi − Xˆi(X−i,M ◦ f(X))
pdµ(Xi)
≥
∫ xi
xi
(z − (xi + xi)/2)
pdz
≥ 2
(
xi − xi
4
)p
xi − xi
4
=
µ(g−1(y))p+1
4p+1/2
≥ µ(JXiK)
p+12−ǫ(p+1)/22p+1.
This concludes the proof.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 6
Note that
J(M1,M2) ◦ f(X)|X−i(ω) = x−iK
=J(M1 ◦ f(X),M2 ◦ f(X))|X−i(ω) = x−iK
⊆JM1 ◦ f(X)|X−i(ω) = x−iK
× JM2 ◦ f(X)|X−i(ω) = x−iK,
and as a result
µ(J(M1,M2) ◦ f(X)|X−i(ω) = x−iK)
≤µ(JM1 ◦ f(X)|X−i(ω) = x−iK)
× µ(JM2 ◦ f(X)|X−i(ω) = x−iK).
Hence,
loge(µ(J(M1,M2) ◦ f(X)|X−i(ω) = x−iK))
≤ loge(µ(JM1 ◦ f(X)|X−i(ω) = x−iK)
× µ(JM2 ◦ f(X)|X−i(ω) = x−iK))
= loge(µ(JM1 ◦ f(X)|X−i(ω) = x−iK))
+ loge(µ(JM2 ◦ f(X)|X−i(ω) = x−iK)).
The proof for discrete uncertain variables follow the same
approach.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF THEOREM 7
The proof follows from that |Jg ◦ M ◦ f(X)|X−i(ω) =
x−iK| ≤ |JM ◦ f(X)|X−i(ω) = x−iK| for any x−i.
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF THEOREM 8
For any given x−i ∈ JX−iK, due to continuity of f , we know
that f(JXiK × {x−i}) = f ◦ ψi,x−i(JXiK) ⊆ [ymin, ymax] is
a connected set (because JXiK is connected). Therefore, if M
is a q-level quantizer, JY |X−i(ω) = x−iK = M ◦ f(JXiK ×
{x−i}) can at most contain qµ(f(JXiK × {x−i}))/(ymax −
ymin) points. Therefore, |JY |X−i(ω) = x−iK| ≤ qSf/(ymax−
ymin). This concludes the proof.
